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The	challenging	future	for	restraint	in	US	foreign
policy
There	has	been	a	growing	debate	over	restraint	in	US	foreign	policy,	fueled	most	recently	by	President
Trump’s	removal	of	troops	from	Syria	last	year.	But,	writes	C.	William	Walldorf,	Jr.,	those	who	wish	to
see	more	restraint	in	US	foreign	policy	face	domestic	challenges:	partisanship,	and	the	need	to	be
seen	to	be	against	the	other	side,	the	desire	by	many	Americans	to	uphold	democratic	values	abroad,
and	the	risk	of	being	seen	as	“soft”	on	national	security.
As	the	Covid-19	pandemic	wanes	in	the	coming	weeks,	debates	among	pundits	and	academics	about
the	future	of	US	grand	strategy	–	especially	around	the	controversial	trend	toward	greater	strategic	restraint	–	are
bound	to	resurface.	Centered	on	the	idea	that	a	less	activist	foreign	policy	is	better	for	US	security,	advocates	of
restraint	press	for	a	drawdown	of	US	troops	from	forward	bases,	a	reduction	in	US	alliance	commitments,	and	an
end	to	militarism	abroad,	especially	US	“forever	wars”	in	the	Middle	East.	Today,	those	who	push	for	restraint	are
buoyed	by	a	sense	of	optimism	that	the	idea	is	catching	on	at	home:	polls	show	the	US	public	is	tired	of	global
leadership;	President	Donald	Trump	supports	important	parts	of	the	restraint	agenda;	and	leading	2020	Democratic
Party	contenders	for	the	White	House	–	including	presumptive	nominee	former	Vice	President	Joe	Biden	–	have
expressed	sympathy	for	various	aspects,	especially	about	US	militarism,	of	restraint	as	well.
Despite	these	optimistic	trends,	however,	restrainers	face	a	challenging	future	that	could	hinder	their	ability	to	bring
lasting	change	to	US	grand	strategy.	Theory	is	one	thing,	application	another.	When	it	comes	to	grand	strategy,	the
domestic	politics	of	what	can	be	done	often	confound	even	the	best	ideas	of	what	should	be	done.	Failure	by
restrainers	to	manage	several	domestic	challenges	today	could	leave	them	on	the	outside	of	policy	debates	looking
in	going	forward.
Partisanship	and	the	challenges	to	the	politics	of	restraint
The	first	challenge	is	partisanship.	Despite	bipartisan	support	for	some	aspects	of	restraint,	Trump’s	highly
polarizing	presidency	with	its	incessant	use	of	wedge	politics	has	also	given	restraint	a	distinct	partisan	home	inside
the	Republican	Party.	Given	today’s	uniquely	tribal	negative	partisanship	in	the	United	States	(in	essence,	a	deep
dislike	of	those	from	the	opposing	party),	strong	pressure	exists	for	Democrats	in	this	election	season	and	beyond
to	be	the	“un-Trump,”	to	essentially	jettison	the	policies	of	the	current	administration	simply	because	of	their
association	with	Trump	and	the	GOP.
Take	for	instance	the	drawdown	of	troops	from	Syria.	Despite	the	almost	unanimous	support	among	Democrats	to
end	Middle	East	wars,	nearly	all	of	the	Democratic	presidential	candidates	repudiated	Trump’s	October	2019
decision	to	withdraw	troops	from	Syria,	which	represents	a	major	plank	in	the	restraint	agenda.	In	the	negative-
partisanship	world	of	US	politics,	partisan	identity	trumps	even	bipartisan	policy	ideas.	This	is	not	good	for	restraint.
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Neither	is	the	fact	that	many	of	Trump’s	most	restraint-based	policies	do	not	sit	well	with	the	general	US	public.
Polls	indicate	that	the	majority	of	Americans	disapprove	of	Trump’s	impetuous	decisions	to	drawdown	troops	from
Syria	and	Afghanistan,	while	even	bigger	majorities	of	Americans	support	US	alliances	like	NATO,	which	Trump	(in
line	with	restrainers)	frequently	criticizes.	In	short,	heading	to	the	November	elections,	Democrats	know	they	carry
strong	support	with	both	their	own	partisan	supporters	and	the	general	public	when	they	oppose	Trump	on	these
issues.	That	spells	potential	trouble	for	restraint	when	Democrats	retake	the	White	House,	which	could	come	as
early	as	January	2021.
Restrainers	and	upholding	values	abroad
Second,	restraint	has	a	values	problem.	Most	restrainers	are	realists,	meaning	they	think	about	the	national	interest
exclusively	through	the	lens	of	geopolitics.	US	citizens	and	many	of	their	leaders	do	not	reason	this	way,	however.
Power	is	important,	but	they	also	look	at	the	world	through	the	lens	of	their	own	identity	and	values.		Hence,	even	in
times	like	today	when	restraint	is	more	popular,	standing	for	values	abroad	remains	of	interest	to	the	public.
A	recent	survey	found,	for	instance,	that	87	percent	of	US	citizens	find	it	very	or	somewhat	important	for	the	United
States	to	defend	human	rights	abroad.	In	another	poll,	a	majority	said	that	democracy	promotion	should	play	at
least	some	role	in	US	policy.	The	same	values	trends	show	up	when	it	comes	to	specific	countries	and	policies	as
well.	79	percent	consider	China’s	human	rights	policy	either	very	or	somewhat	serious,	while	large	majorities	of
Americans	supported	Trump’s	2018	airstrikes	to	punish	Syria	for	the	use	of	chemical	weapons.
In	general,	restrainers	are	right	to	point	to	the	dangers	of	over-expansion	and	militarism	that	come	with	a	foreign
policy	too	focused	on	promoting	democracy	and	human	rights.	But,	ignoring	these	issue	altogether	could	cost	them
politically.
The	political	risk	of	being	“soft”	on	national	security	issues
Third,	restrainers	face	the	danger	of	being	labeled	at	home	as	“weak”	or	“soft”	on	national	security.	This	may	sound
ironic	given	the	attention	restrainers	give	to	power	and	geopolitics.	Yet,	across	US	history,	this	label	has	been
politically	devastating,	at	times,	for	advocates	of	restraint.
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New	research	finds,	more	specifically,	that	these	kinds	of	“soft”	charges	become	especially	damaging	to	restraint	in
historical	moments	when	broad	public	narratives	calling	for	the	promotion	and	protection	of	liberal	political	order
abroad	are	prominent	in	US	national	policy	debates.	Fearing	that	political	rivals	may	get	the	upper-hand	by
appealing	to	these	narratives,	leaders	(sometimes	against	their	better	judgement)	often	pursue	aggressive	policies
abroad	to	measure	up	to	standards	set	by	narratives	so	as	to	avoid	looking	“weak”	on	national	security.	Fears	of
being	labelled	“soft	on	communism”	at	home	pushed	Presidents	Harry	Truman	and	Lyndon	Johnson	toward	wars	in
Korea	and	Vietnam,	for	instance,	against	their	better	strategic	judgement.	Evidence	also	shows	that	worries	of
being	labeled	“soft	on	terrorism”	after	9/11	played	an	important	role	in	President	George	W.	Bush’s	decision	to
invade	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	as	well	as	Barack	Obama’s	choice	to	militarily	reengage	in	Iraq	following	the	rise	of
ISIS.	Nearly	all	of	these	wars	defied	policy	proposals	by	restrainers	at	the	time.
Today,	the	prospects	for	“soft”	charges	remain	in	the	United	States	and	could	get	even	more	pronounced	in	coming
years.	Drawing	on	the	anti-terrorism	narrative	which	is	very	much	still	with	us,	critics	used	labels	like	“calamitous,”
“retreat,”	and	“choosing	to	lose”	to	decry	Trump’s	Syria	decision	last	year.	Trump	capitulated	to	this	pressure
(against	the	wishes	of	restrainers)	by	leaving	a	residual	force	in	Syria.	Similarly,	the	heated	anti-China	discourse	in
the	United	States	around	Covid-19	is	likely	to	strengthen	an	already	nascent	anti-authoritarian	narrative	that	could
spark	a	new	Cold	War	in	Asia.	If	this	happens,	good	proposals	by	restrainers	on	the	proper	lessons	of	this
pandemic	will	likely	get	sidelined	and	replaced	instead	by	the	kind	of	militarism,	alliance	commitments,	and	troop
deployments	that	restrainers	disdain	most.
Overall,	restrainers	have	had	a	positive	impact	on	US	policy	debates	over	the	past	decade	or	so.	However,	a
course	correction	is	now	in	order.	Specifically,	restrainers	need	to	distance	themselves	from	Trump	(as	some
already	have)	and	build	stronger	ties	across	party	lines;	endorse	at	least	some	low-cost	initiatives	to	protect	human
rights	and	promote	democracy	(something	restrainers	accepted	early	on,	but	have	abandoned	in	recent	years);	and
develop	grassroots	(as	opposed	to	simply	elite-focused)	initiatives	to	generate	more	pragmatic,	temperate	thinking
among	the	US	public,	rather	than	the	panic	and	hysteria	that	usually	comes	with	robust	narratives	for	action	abroad.
These	moves	may	not	all	lead	to	the	policies	that	restrainers	prefer.	But,	they	are	critical	if	restrainers	wish	to
remain	politically	relevant,	which	is	something	the	United	States	desperately	needs	in	order	to	maintain	sober
judgement	in	the	face	of	the	strategic	challenges	–	both	old	and	new–	that	lie	ahead.
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